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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I. ALL EVIDENCE ARISING OUT OF THE DAQ INSPECTION OF THE 
DUMPSTER SITE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED LEAVING 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO UPHOLD THE FINDING OF A 
VIOLATION OF ASBESTOS RULES. 
A. The Exclusionary Rule Applies to This Air Quality Citation Case. 
Respondent argues that the exclusionary rule does not apply to this case because it 
is an administrative case (Brief of Respondent [hereinafter "BR"] at 17-18). This 
assertion is not only too broad but is incorrect. First, respondent acknowledges that the 
rule applies to administrative proceedings that are quasi-criminal in nature. (Id. at 18). In 
Sims v. Collection Division of State Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992), cited by 
respondent, the court stated that tax proceedings were quasi-criminal in nature because 
they rested at least in part on objectives of punishment and deterrence (Id. at 14). In the 
instant case, the Air Quality Board proceeding contains a similar purpose as reflected in 
the fact that its enforcement actions are based upon "notices of violation." (See 
Petitioner's Brief, Addendum at 2). Further, as in Sims, enforcement of Air Quality rules 
is "inextricably connected" with proof of quasi-criminal activities for which penalties can 
ultimately be assessed for release of hazardous air pollutants (See Utah Code Annotated 
§19-1-303, §19-2-115(3)-(7)). 
The exclusionary rule applies in the analogous situation of Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration hearings. (Trinity Industries v. Occupational Safety and 
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Health Review Commission, 16 F.3d 1455, 1461 (6th Cir. 1994)). The purpose of those 
hearings is to deter violations of rules which may endanger health and safety. The object 
is to penalize a party {id. at 1462). In the instant case, the ultimate object of the 
administrative hearing is to provide a basis for obtaining monetary penalties against 
petitioner. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule should apply as a remedy for constitutional 
right violations in environmental violation proceedings. 
B. Warrantless Searches Are Not Justified By the Fact That Petitioner is a 
Regulated Business or Even a Closely Regulated Business, 
Respondent asserts that petitioner is a closely regulated business that is constantly 
required to provide information to the Division of Air Quality. As such, respondent 
asserts that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything it does (BR at 
19). 
However, respondent the acknowledges that close regulation alone does not 
preclude the exclusionary rule remedy NOR the requirement that administrative searches 
must be based on some statutory procedure which is a constitutionally adequate substitute 
for a warrant (BR at 20). But, respondent fails to deal in more than a conclusory manner 
with the fact that the Division of Air Quality inspection procedures cited on Page 11 of 
Petitioner's Brief contain no protective procedures which would serve as a substitute 
action for the protections of a warrant as required by Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 
605 (1980). Respondent merely states, "combination of the statute and the Notification is 
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sufficiently comprehensive that an asbestos contractor cannot help but be aware that he 
will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes." (BR at 22-23). 
This position totally fails to identify any warrant-like restriction on the DAQ 
inspector's discretion because there is none under Utah statutes. If respondent were 
correct, any inspector driving down the street could decide to inspect any business at any 
time and enter into any portion of the business in specific violation of the business's 
privacy rights identified in Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 310 (1978). The 
thought of such unbridled discretion in a state inspector is repugnant to privacy rights 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The 
unreasonableness of the DAQ inspector's actions is amplified further as it is undisputed 
that he did not even follow the Air Quality Board's own inadequate rules because he 
failed to present his credentials to anyone prior to the search as required by Utah Code 
Annotated §19-1-203(1). His warrantless search was unjustified. 
C. The DAQ Inspector Did Not Have Rocky Mountain's or Any Other 
Owner's Permission to Enter the Property Rocky Mountain Was 
Occupying and Look in Its Dumpster. 
The inspector did not get Rocky Mountain's permission to go on the lot it was 
occupying and look in its dumpster. There is no dispute as to this fact. However, 
respondent claims the inspector had permission of the "property owner" (BR at 23). The 
inspector admitted he never got permission to look in the dumpster (HT 228). He also 
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could not verify that the lady, with whom he spoke owned the property on which the 
dumpster was sitting; all he could say was that he was under the understanding that the 
property on which the dumpster was sitting was the same property or was owned by the 
same person who owned an adjacent home, even though the lot surrounding the dumpster 
was fenced off from the home (HT 227, 226, R277). The inspector admitted he never 
even asked to go on the property - - he simply told the neighbor he was going to go over 
and look around and she said, "okay." (HT 228). He never understood he had permission 
from the owner (HT 438). Also, he never got permission to look in the dumpster itself 
(id.). Even if the next door neighbor was the owner of the property, and there is no 
evidence or even a foundation for the inspector's "understanding" that she may have 
been, the inspector only told the person he was going to go look at the dumpster and the 
person "didn't really say anything about it." (HT 228). 
The inspector acknowledged that someone else questioned what he was doing on 
the property (HT 443-44). In fact, he did not get consent because he felt he did not need 
approval from anyone to go on private property and look in the dumpster inasmuch as he 
had a card from the executive director of his division which he believed gave him 
authority to search any private property (HT 438, 447-48). Accordingly, it is clear that 
the inspector not only did not have a good faith basis for believing he had permission to 
go on the property but had no objective basis for permission to enter the property and 
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perform an inspection. The search results should have been suppressed. 
D. Petitioner Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Dumpster. 
Respondent asserts that petitioner did not take reasonable steps to express a 
privacy interest in the dumpster. None of the cases respondent relies upon are apposite 
because they refer to contraband or evidence being out in plain view. In the instant case, 
as noted in the petitioner's brief, the dumpster itself was in a closed fence (HT 215). The 
inspector had to open the gate and go through the fence, unlike in State v. Belgard, 840 
P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1992), relied upon by respondent (BR at 24). Further, the 
inspector had to walk over to the dumpster, walk to the back of it which was not in view 
of the public from the street, and look through an opening into the dumpster in order to 
see what was there (HT 226-27). Even the video and photograph relied upon by 
respondent do not show any asbestos debris visible from outside the fence (See R277). 
There was thus no indication the lot was an "open field" because there was no 
observation of these items from the edge of the property (See State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 
1056, 1058-59 (Ut. App. 1992)). There was clearly an expectation of privacy in the 
dumpster and its contents and the illegally seized evidenced from it should be suppressed. 
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II. PETITIONER PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND 
MARSHALING DEMONSTRATED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
A. Marshaling of Evidence. 
Respondent claims that petitioner failed to marshal DAQ's evidence showing that 
bags in the dumpster were placed there by petitioner (BR 16). Actually, petitioner did not 
raise an insufficiency of evidence argument with regard to whom the bags in the dumpster 
belonged to or by whom they were placed (Petitioner's Brief [hereinafter "PB"] at 16-17). 
Rather, the dumpster insufficiency arguments related to the fact that all of the dumpster 
evidence should have been suppressed because it was seized through unlawful means by 
DAQ (PB at 12) and that the chain of custody documents for the dumpster were irregular 
and afforded no foundation for the test results showing the presence of asbestos (PB at 
17). Respondent's argument thus does not apply to this case. 
Respondent also argues that with regard to the Cunningham residence, petitioner 
only referred to asbestos found in the corner and admitted reference to asbestos sampled 
over the cabinets and bookcases (BR at 16-17). Again, this argument is irrelevant. The 
lack of substantial evidence argument with regard to the Cunningham residence was 
based on the fact there was no proof under Air Quality Board's own rules that the 
asbestos present was in a sufficient concentration to be regulated by the State because it 
was not point-counted (PB at 14). Thus, even if there was debris around the cabinets and 
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bookcases, it was not proven to be regulated asbestos containing materials or debris. (Id.) 
Respondent cites nothing in the record which indicates that debris over the cabinets and 
bookcases was established under its rules to be regulated asbestos containing material 
("RACM") because there is none (BR at 16). 
Finally, respondent asserts that petitioner failed to refer to the "profusion" of 
documentary evidence DAQ submitted which "maintains" that the Red Rock School 
project was a NESHAP size project (BR at 16-17). However, each of the documents 
respondent cites either do not support respondent's contention or are simply notification 
documents or acknowledgments of the notification documents. They contain nothing 
outside of petitioner's mere notification which is merely an "estimate" (HT 266). 
There is no evidence of a measured precise dimension other than petitioner's 
actual measurement when it got to the site showing that the length of the pipe was below 
the dimensions required for NESHAP standards to be imposed. Of the documents cited 
by respondent at BR 17: 1) R73 contains nothing about NESHAP size projects. This is 
probably a mistaken reference and was intended to be R74 which states 275 feet of 
asbestos containing pipe insulation will be removed. However, this is simply a number 
based on the asbestos notification estimate from petitioner; 2) R97 is a TEM air sample 
count sheet on which the amount of suspected asbestos at the project is not identified to 
petitioner's knowledge; 3) R103 is simply a certification which contains no reference to 
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the dimensions of the project and is simply attached as a certification to RIO 1 which was 
cited in petitioner's brief (BR at 19); 4) R106 is an irrelevant estimate stating merely that 
"approximately 275 lineal feet of air cell TSI will be removed." (Id.) This again is a 
mere request for bids with no foundation for the measurement. It is an estimate and is 
100% hearsay which fails to establish the precise size of the project; 5) Rl 10 contains no 
reference to the project dimension; 6) R362-65 are merely certifications and respirator 
cards which make no reference to the project being NESHAP size. (See respondent's 
reference to the record at BR 17.) 
In sum, petitioner adequately marshaled the evidence for its insufficient evidence 
arguments and respondent has failed to establish otherwise. 
B. Insufficient Evidence. 
Respondent next asserts that it was not required to comply with its own rules and 
establish the presence of regulated asbestos by point counting when the estimated 
concentrations were under 10%. (BR at 29). Respondent also maintains that it was 
entitled to rely on petitioner's notification to establish the presence of asbestos. (BR 29-
30). Respondent argues that it was entitled to rely on defective chain of custody 
documents because petitioner stipulated entirely to the chain of custody and DAQ's 
documents were sufficient. (BR 30-31). Finally, respondent claims that petitioner's 
notifications and subsequent conduct, including a failure to revise its estimate of asbestos 
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notification, established that the Red Rock School project was a NESHAP size project. 
(BR 34). 
1. Failure to Conduct Point Counts and Non-Relevance of 
Notifications. 
Regarding the ability of DAQ to meet its burden of proof by relying on the 
notification submitted by petitioner, the DAQ is simply wrong. Under its own 
regulations, the notification is not intended to establish the presence of Regulated 
Asbestos Containing Material ("RACM"). Rather, it notifies the State that there may be 
asbestos present and a contractor has been retained by the owner to remove the materials 
as if they contained asbestos. Respondent's rule only states that the notification need 
contain an "'estimate5 of approximate amount of Asbestos Containing Material to be 
stripped...." {See Utah Administrative Code [hereinafter "UAC"], rules R307-801-
6A(6)(g); R307-801-6B(1), BR Appendix at 9-10). The notification is thus merely an 
estimate and is not a certification that there is RACM present. Respondent is attempting 
to establish that the notification certifies something other than what the rule says it 
certifies. 
Only through samples testing can it be established whether the material is 
regulated and thus whether its improper removal can support the finding of a violation. 
Rocky Mountain did not certify that the material it was removing was regulated friable 
asbestos. It only certified an estimation of asbestos that may be present. In fact, it is 
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interesting that the State's notification form contains no oath, declaration or other 
"certification" language (e.g. R173). 
Second, respondent works through various federal regulations to argue that the 
point count requirements are not necessary to establish Asbestos Containing Material as 
RACM notwithstanding what the State's own regulatory definitions say (BR 26-28). It is 
important to note that respondent fails to cite to the Utah definitions and regulations 
which it attempted to enforce (Id.). Rather, it attempts to rely on a hearsay memorandum 
which is not even a regulation from a federal employee trying to show that the point count 
requirements apply only to owners or operators and not to the State. This tortured 
analysis ignores (and does not even cite to) respondent's own rules which mandate point 
counting as a prerequisite for a finding of RACM where the visually estimated content is 
less than 10% (UAC, rule R307-80M). 
Respondent cites a general statutory definition but the statute does not alter or 
conflict with the regulation. It is respondent's regulation which should control in this 
case and not some hearsay opinion or memorandum from an acting director of Stationary 
Source Compliance Division in the federal Environmental Protection Agency Office of 
Air Quality Planning & Standards which has not been adopted as a regulation and which 
does not carry the force of law. 
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An agency must comply with its own regulations and in fact may even limit its 
own discretion by its regulations (See McBride v. Motor Vehicle Division, 977 P.2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1999)). In fact, when an agency ignores its own rules, it acts arbitrarily and 
capriciously (R.O.A. General, Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 966 P.2d 840, 
842 (Utah 1998)). In this case, the agency is bound by its own definition of what 
constitutes RACM. The failure to point count samples in the instances specified in 
petitioner's brief render DAQ's evidence insufficient to support the Air Quality Board's 
findings. The mere fact that asbestos is friable does not make it regulated. RACM is 
simply a subset of friable asbestos, even under the federal regulations cited by 
respondent; the asbestos content was estimated at less than 10% and required verification 
by point counting before respondent could regulate it (See 40 CFR Section 61.141, BR 
Addendum C). 
2. Chain of Custody. 
Respondent next contends petitioner's chain of custody argument was waived by a 
stipulation to the regularity of chain of custody documents (BR 30-31). Respondent 
draws an unwarranted conclusion from the stipulation and failed to cite the whole 
stipulation. The stipulation included language saying respondent would not have to 
produce lab personnel in to establish the chain of custody. However, petitioner made it 
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very clear that it would be objecting to chain of custody on the basis of gaps and other 
irregularities in the documents - - matters on which lab personnel would have no say. 
Respondent failed to cite the whole stipulation by alleging that petitioner simply 
stipulated that it "wouldn't be requiring [DAQ] to bring people from the lab or anything 
like that to establish chain of custody." (BR 31). Actually, the stipulation was stated, by 
Rocky Mountain without objection from respondent as "I also told the Government that 
we wouldn't be requiring them to bring people from the lab or anything like that to 
establish chain of custody. We're just arguing that there's sufficient gaps in the data and 
the signatures and the dates in the chain of custody documents [so] that [they] are not 
reliable." (HT 11-12). Thus, there was never any stipulation that irregularities in the 
documents would be waived. Rocky Mountain has not waived this issue on appeal and is 
not estopped from raising the inadequacy in the documents now. In fact, as noted in the 
Brief of Petitioner, petitioner repeatedly objected to the test results for lack of foundation 
due to lack of chain of custody reliability in the documents (PB at 17). 
Respondent next claims that the chain of custody arguments were groundless 
because of the measures taken at DAQ to protect the evidence. What DAQ did is not 
important. It is what happened at the lab that is relevant to this appeal. 
Regarding Sample 2 on the Redwood Road Apartments, respondent claims the 
date stamp on the lab custody document somehow establishes when R. Armano received 
12 
the sample (BR 32). In fact, it does not. The form is irregular on its face in that R. 
Armano signed the received block but failed to fill in a date and time. There is thus no 
indication of a proper chain of custody including dates and times. The fact E. Spencer 
signed the document in some other location or it had a stamp on it, neither of which had a 
reference to any event of receipt, likewise renders the document totally irregular. The 
appearance of a lab witness would not have cured the irregularities in the chain of custody 
document itself because they could only authenticate the document and nothing more (See 
R175). 
As noted in the petitioner's brief, the same problems existed with regard to the 
Eagles Club (R242) and the dumpster samples (R271). No statement on the forms 
indicated when the sample was received or what happened to it. Irregularities in the 
chains of custody were not waived and form an insufficient foundation for the evidence. 
The issue was preserved by objection and the evidence should not have been considered. 
3. Red Rock School Non-NESHAP Size Project. 
Respondent next argues that there was ample evidence that the Red Rock School 
project was a NESHAP size project because of the estimate in the notice document 
submitted by petitioner and the estimated measurements in the school district's request 
for proposal (BR 35), Mere estimates by petitioner and by the school are insufficient and 
inadequately founded to show the tine dimensions of the Asbestos Containing Material or 
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support a violation. The only substantial evidence on this point was the actual 
measurement performed by Rocky Mountain while at the project showing only 240 feet, 
less than the NESHAP size standard of 260 feet (HT 272). This figure was uncontested 
by any relevant evidence as the only actual measurement. 
However, now respondent claims that since Rocky Mountain failed to modify its 
original notification estimate of 275 feet, the project must have been a NESHAP size 
project. Respondent totally overlooks the point that for NESHAP size projects, the 
written notice does not have to be updated unless the amount of asbestos affected changes 
by at least 20% (UAC, rule R307-801-6A(5)). Thus, there would have had to have been a 
change of over 50 feet (not just the 35 feet from 275 to 240) for petitioner to be required 
to amend its notice {See BR at 37). Also, the notice was based on a mere hearsay 
estimate from the school district and could not contradict an actual measurement (R106). 
Respondent further attempts to support its arguments on the fact that petitioner 
never returned any payments or requested a refund of a fee overpayment to DAQ due to 
decreased amounts of RACM (BR at 37). This evidence is speculative and totally 
insufficient to rebut the actual measurement by petitioner of the Asbestos Containing 
Material at the site. There is nothing which would compel petitioner to refund any 
contract funds to the school district on this fixed sum project or to request a refund of any 
fee paid to DAQ. The request for proposal from the school district in the record is simply 
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a specification for a bid and DAQ failed to produce any evidence showing that the 
contract between Rocky Mountain and the school district was anything other than a fixed 
fee contract with no requirement for petitioner to refund anything to the school district 
(Rl05-112). Further, there was no request for reimbursement from DAQ on the fee 
because the project remained in the same fee class regardless of whether it was under 260 
lineal feet. (See example of DAQ fee class schedule at R170). There was no basis for a 
reduction request. Accordingly, the decision of the Air Quality Board is not supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner Rocky Mountain Asbestos Abatement, Inc. 
requests that the Court reverse the findings of the Utah Air Quality Board. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this 3_A day of October, 2001. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
SaSuelDTMcVey 1 
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I hereby certify that on this day of October, 2001,1 caused two true and 
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Melissa Hubbell, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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